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Chinese Claim to the South China Sea 
under International Law
The main objective of this article is to present a brief overview of the 
dispute in the South China Sea, focusing on China’s claims and a legal 
perspective on the issue. In the introduction the author presents the ge-
ography and history of the dispute as well as the main laws introduced in 
China on maritime zones and the submissions of the disputants to the 
Commission on the Continental Shelf in 2009. It also focuses on the pol-
itics in the region providing an example of main initiatives undertaken on 
the ASEAN forum. The second part of the article provides a legal analysis 
of the claim with a particular reference to the “Nine-dashed line,” which 
has the biggest influence on the current understanding of the Chinese 
position. Lastly, the author refers to the arbitration case initiated by the 
Phillipines, which is one of the disputants, and where China is reluctant 
to take any legal steps. 
The article attempts to answer the question whether in such a com-
plicated legal dispute it is possible to reach a peaceful settlement in ac-
cordance with international law.
Introduction 
The South China Sea is of great importance not only to the Southeast 
Asian states, but to the whole international community. Through its wa-
ters leads one of the world’s main shipping routes, the area is rich in oil 
and gas reserves in the seabed and the subsoil, and, also has wide grounds 
for fisheries.
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The South China Sea is a  semi-enclosed sea covering an area of 
3.5 million km2, where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Ma-
laysia and Brunei Darussalam present claims. The dispute can be traced 
back decades and is still called “the troubled waters.” There are several 
island groups that are disputed in the South China Sea.
The first group are the Paracels, known also as the Xisha Islands (in 
Chinese), which are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Paracel 
Islands since 1974 are occupied by China, which in the same time does not 
see the Paracels as being disputed. There are around 35 islets, reefs or shoals 
with Woody Island, measuring 2.1 km2 as the biggest one (Gau & Jia 2013).
The second group are the Spratly Islands, named the Nansha Islands 
by the Chinese, and are the biggest group of around 250 islands, islets, 
rocks and shoals, among which around 25 are islands, with Itu Aba being 
the largest. The features are claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei Darussalam. All the states, except the lat-
ter, are occupying some of the features in this particular area.
Macclesfield Bank known as the Zhongsha Islands (in Chinese), in-
cluding the only part that is permanently above sea level at high tide – the 
Scarborough Shoal – is disputed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines 
and consists of rocks, sandbanks and reefs. The Pratas Islands, in Chinese 
known as the Dongsha Islands are claimed by China and Taiwan, but will 
not be discussed further in this paper.
China provides evidence of their use of the sea two millennia back, but 
more importantly refers to recent decades in establishing their case in the 
South China Sea. In the 1930s the government appointed a  commission, 
which in 1935 produced the result of its work of examining private maps as an 
atlas of 132 insular features in the South China Sea (Talmon & Jia 2014, p. 3).
China states that it has recovered the Paracel and Spratly Islands after 
the Second World War, in 1946, when Japan renounced all their islands in 
the Pacific (Gao & Jia 2013, p. 102). Moreover, according to the Chinese, 
there was no objection for doing so by the other states of the region.
In 1947 the Chinese government issued the eleven-dashed line map 
“to indicate the geographical scope of its authority over the South China 
Sea” (Gao & Jia 2013, p. 102). In the late 1940s, the government pub-
lished and circulated another list with 172 names of islands and placed 
them under the authority of the Hainan District. The eleven-dashed line 
is explained further in the paper as the nine-dashed line, but at this point 
it is noteworthy to point out that it was the Republic of China, which in 
1946 first presented this map.
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It was not till the mid-1950s, when the Philippines suggested that 
some of the Spratly Islands and Macclesfield Bankshould belong to them 
and also, when two lines from the eleven-dashed line in the Gulf of Tonkin 
were removed (Roque 1997; Greenfield 1992; Amer 2002).
China’s Laws on Maritime Zones
China has been issuing laws, like the 1958 Declaration on China’s 
Territorial Sea, where it has asserted the ownership titles to all groups of 
islands in the South China Sea (Dupuy & Dupuy 2013, p. 126). Such an 
approach has been confirmed in the 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China and then in 1996 
when China ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). 
In the declaration to the Convention, China has stated that it shall 
enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an exclusive economic zone of 
200 nautical miles and the continental shelf. 1  China notes that through 
consultations and on the basis of international law and in accordance with 
the principle of equitability, it will effect the delimitation of the boundary 
of the maritime jurisdiction with the states with coasts opposite or adja-
cent to China. In the same time, in article 3, it reaffirms its sovereignty 
over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in the 1992 Law on Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 
In 1998 China adopted the Exclusive Economic Zone and Conti-
nental Shelf Act stating that it enjoys all rights within this areas and 
its provisions shall not affect its historical rights. In 2006 China made 
a declaration under article 298 of UNCLOS, and does not accept compul-
sory procedures over certain disputes concerning maritime delimitation 
or military and law enforcement activities.
Submissions to the Commission on the Continental Shelf 
Limits
On May 6, 2009, on the basis of article 76 (8) UNCLOS, Vietnam and 
Malaysia jointly presented to the Commission on the Continental Shelf 
1 See: United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chinese 
declaration to UNCLOS, viewed on May 7, 2014, http://www.un.org/depts/los/conven-
tion_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China Upon ratification.
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Limits relevant information and maps regarding the continental shelf.2 In 
the same time, they stipulated that the proposal does not affect the issue 
of the continental shelf delimitation in the region. 
A day later, on May 7, 2009, China presented on the United Nations 
forum the U-shaped line and underlined that it exercised sovereignty over 
the islands in the South China Sea and had jurisdiction over designated 
sea areas. China criticized the proposal of Vietnam and Malaysia as a vi-
olation of its rights. In response to China’s position, Vietnam claimed 
that China does not have any grounds, legal nor historical, to present the 
nine-dotted line. The Philippines called the Commission on the Conti-
nental Shelf to refrain from giving an opinion on this matter until the 
dispute would not be solved.
The second proposal to the Commission on the Continental Shelf 
from Vietnam regarded the northern part of the continental shelf. China, 
again, presented the U-shaped line and criticized the authorities of the 
Philippines for the claims towards a group of islands in the Spratly archi-
pelago called Kalayaan.
Actions Taken on the ASEAN Forum
It is noteworthy to present the action taken on the ASEAN forum, 
where China has been actively involved. A first breakthrough occurred in 
2002 with the adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea by the ASEAN Members and China at the ASEAN 
Summit. According to s. 4 of the declaration, the parties concerned un-
dertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly 
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in 
accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, 
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The parties should not complicate and escalate the conflict and shall re-
frain from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs 
and shoals. The parties reaffirmed their will to adopt a binding and more 
detailed Code of Conduct in the South China Sea which would further 
promote peace and stability in the region. In the next years the declara-
2 See: United Nations, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Submissions 
to the CLCS, Joint Submission by Vietnam and Malaysia, viewed on May 7, 2014, http://
www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm.
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tion has been described as a milestone and used in all political disputes 
occurring in the South China Sea.
In 2011 in Jakarta, the states adopted guidelines for the implemen-
tation of the conduct of parties in the South China Sea. Once again, the 
role of bilateral talks between the members of ASEAN and China was 
presented.
Thanks to the diplomacy actions, in July 2012 ASEAN’s 6-point prin-
ciples on the South China Sea were adopted. It was merely a reaffirmed 
consensus and an attempt at lowering down the tensions occurring at that 
time in the region (BBC 2013).
Currently, occasionally there are actions causing other claimants to 
protest, but the biggest focus is at the moment on the arbitration be-
tween the Philippines and China, explained further by the author. The 
next point will present the concept of the nine-dashed line in order to fully 
understand the dispute, also from the legal point of view.
The Legal Meaning of the Nine-Dashed Line 
The U-shaped line, called also the nine-dashed line, lacks clarity from 
the government. To date, there has been no suggestion on how to un-
derstand the line presented 60 years ago and again in the last 5 years 
(Valencia 1995; Valencia, van Dyke & Ludwig 1997; Lo 1989; Gau 2012; 
United Nations 2009). The line is not precise in its coordinates and is 
rather a general indication of what the maritime delimitation boundaries 
should look like. It runs in close proximity of the Vietnamese, Malaysian, 
Bruneian and the Philippine coast. 
Chinese scholars suggest the “three layered theory,” which means that 
China has sovereignty over all the features within the lines on the map, 
and where the historic rights are an addition to the UNCLOS provisions. 
Such rights would be fishing, navigation, exploration and exploitation of 
resources. The nine-dashed line may also be a maritime boundary, as if it 
was delimited as a median line between the islands and the coastline (Gao 
& Jia 2013, p. 108; Fu 2013, p. 12; Keynan 2000).
Kuen-Chen Fu notes that “the U  shaped line, delimited by China 
in the area, is the outer limit of China’s ‘historic waters’ in the SCS and 
a pending ocean boundary, which requires identification through negotia-
tions and its neighboring States” (Fu 2013, p. 12).
On the other hand, China is ensuring that its laws are consistent with 
the provisions set out in UNCLOS. Therefore, even when the meaning of 
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some of the presented notions is lacking, it should be taken into account 
that there is no other evidence available proving that China wants the 
South China Sea as their internal waters or historic waters, which could be 
considered as not compliant with the convention (Gao & Jia 2013, p. 109).
Consequently, one can establish three main legal issues in assess-
ing whether the nine-dashed line is legitimate under international law, 
including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(Valencia 1995; Valencia, van Dyke & Ludwig 1997; Hong 2012).
Territorial Sovereignty
The first one regards the sovereignty of a state over the features in 
the South China Sea. China relies its ownership on the discovery and 
occupation, alternatively presenting the historic title. It is noteworthy to 
point out that UNCLOS does not have any provisions on sovereignty; 
the states have to rely on customary international law provisions in this 
matter. Gao and Jia (2013, p. 110) present an opinion that the evidence 
of China’s discovery of the islands is “simply overwhelming.” They also 
refer to occupation as a mode of acquisition of the territory and point out 
that a state needs to do it peacefully and continuously over terra nullius 
or after a definite renunciation of a previous sovereign (Gao & Jia 2013, 
p. 110). That might be a reference to Japan renouncing their sovereignty 
over the islands in South China Sea after the Second World War. Chi-
na objects to the legal meaning of events occurring before World War II, 
considering the French occupation of the islands (which Vietnam uses as 
proof of their claim) as unlawful. They also contest the effective occupa-
tion of the Scarborough Shoal by the Philippines proving that China has 
shown “a consistent line of legislative and administrative acts” in respect 
to all of the groups of islands (Gao & Jia 2013, p. 113).
Maritime Delimitation
The second legal issue is connected with the maritime zones that can 
be generated from the features in the South China Sea and the legal status 
of such islands and rocks.
The geographical nature of the South China Sea requires taking into 
account opposing larger areas and the possible overlaps of the maritime 
zones. In a case of a semi-enclosed sea and in the case of so many con-
tested ownership issues, it is extremely difficult to reach a consensus on 
all of the issues.
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In addition, it has to be determined whether the Paracel Islands and 
Spratly Islands are islands in the meaning of article 121 of UNCLOS or 
are there other provisions applicable. The definition states that an island 
is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide. Having this legal status enables a similar delimitation 
from the basic lines of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, exclusive 
economic zone, and continental shelf as in the land territory. Subject to 
s. 3 of the article, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or eco-
nomic life of their own shall have no economic zone or continental shelf. 
Moreover, the convention in article 13 distinguishes low tide elevations. 
They are naturally formed areas of land that are surrounded by and above 
water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low tide elevation 
is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea 
from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.
If the maritime zones that can be generated from the islands and conti-
nent are overlapping, then accordingly with UNCLOS, states should coop-
erate in exercising their rights and obligations. All the claimants are parties 
to UNCLOS.3 They have the right to establish 200 nautical-mile exclusive 
economic zones and a continental shelf of the same width. On the other 
hand, accordingly to the case law, the states should refer to established rules 
and methods on maritime delimitation, i.e. to the equidistance and rele-
vant circumstances rule (Tanaka 2006, pp. 43–46; Paik 2012, pp. 199–221).
Fu (2013, p. 26) due to the case law, considers a few factors to be rele-
vant in the process of maritime delimitation, such as geographical consid-
erations (natural prolongation of land territories, distance, proportionality 
of the length of coast lines, configuration of the coast, baselines, low-tide 
elevations), geological and geomorphologic considerations, historic inter-
ests in term of fishing and navigations, and social economic considera-
tions (economic dependency, natural resources, security interests).
Historic Rights
Another possible legal concept, presented by China is the one of the 
historic rights (Keynan 2000; Duong 1997, p. 47; Whiting 1997–1998, 
p. 897). Some authors raise also the possibility of the South China Sea 
3 Full list of State Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982 on the DOALOS website: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_agreements.htm. Taiwan is not a party to UNCLOS.
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being historic waters through the principle of historic titles or the his-
toric title over the insular features itself (Dupuy & Dupuy 2013, p. 138). 
All said above is to be treated supplementary to the previously presented 
modes of territory acquisition, which China considers prevailing.
The main differences between these two concepts is the fact that 
a historic title justifies claims over maritime zones, whereas the historic 
rights relate mostly to fishing rights, not excluding other states’ sover-
eignty over a certain area. Historic waters, on the other hand, should refer 
only to the waters that are in close proximity to the mainland, not hun-
dreds of miles away. 
Even if China presents the historic titles concept as a binding one, 
it needs to evidence the exercise of authority over the area, continuity 
over time of this exercise of authority and the attitude and acceptance of 
foreign states to the claim. According to Gao and Jia (2013), the evidence 
that there has been acquiescence by other disputants of the nine-dashed 
line lies in the fact that till 2009 none of them has formally objected to 
it. That could be a ground for the estoppel principle, where the other state 
cannot refrain from its previous actions, which led to another state’s be-
lief in the validity of such acquiescence (Gao & Jia 2013, p. 116). On the 
other hand, Dupuy states (2013, p. 141) that there have been “repeated 
displays of disagreement by the states in the region,” giving the example 
of Vietnam, which has lodged protests against China’s laws and declara-
tion for decades.
The meaning of the maps, presented in the 1940s and in the course 
of the submissions to the Commission on the Continental Shelf Limits 
remains unclear. So far there has been no official legal justification of it 
and one can only assume what it means based on the Chinese scholars’ 
work. In that case, they refer to the “three layered theory” providing the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and additionally sup-
porting customary international law. Not all of the legal concepts have 
a definition under UNCLOS, therefore causing even more ambiguity in its 
meaning (Gao & Jia 2013, p. 123). Some scholars put in doubt whether 
a sixty-year-old map can be sufficient evidence of a state’s effective control 
over an area and whether an international tribunal would decide that it 
constitutes a title (Dupuy & Dupuy 2012, p. 132).
Having said that, it is interesting to have a closer look on the arbitra-
tion instituted by the Philippines in 2013, where the nine-dashed line is 
one of the grounds of the Statement and Notification of Claim.
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China and the Third Party Adjudication 
China has always preferred bilateral negotiations to third party dis-
pute settlement (Pan 2009; Miyoshi 2012). Such a position is stated in the 
declarations on the ASEAN forum and proved in their actions before the 
international tribunals, where to date it has not been an active participant 
of any proceedings (Talmon & Jia 2014).
One may refer to the strong Chinese nationalism as a ground for legit-
imacy for the government and the objections that existed strongly in the 
1980s to the adjudication bodies, which did not reflect the legal systems 
of the world in China’s view (Pan 2009; Miyoshi 2012).
Pan (2012, p. 105) writes that “Chinese nationalism, as one of the 
most effective instruments available for the Chinese government to deal 
with its domestic and foreign affairs, has profound implications for its 
choice of method to resolve its territorial and boundary disputes.”
China may use the International Court of Justice, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or any other arbitral tribunal, when the 
national interest requires it. Until then, it seems participation in any pro-
ceedings may be “labelled as harming Chinese national sovereignty” (Pan 
2012, pp. 111–112).
Consequently, China is making reservations and declarations to in-
ternational treaties when acceding or ratifying them. It has ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996, but made 
a declaration under article 298 only in 2006. It seems that for 10 years it 
was possible for another state to bring the case for compulsory adjudica-
tion under Part XV of the Convention. One of the reasons it has been so, 
is that China strongly relied on good relations with neighboring states and 
did not assume that any of them could bring a case against it to arbitra-
tion (Pan 2012, pp. 120–126).
The Philippines v. China Arbitration
On January 22, 2013, the Philippines instituted proceedings against 
China under Annex VII of the Convention. China refuses to participate in 
the proceedings and objects to the jurisdiction and the admissibility of the 
claims. Undoubtedly, the case will have an impact on the other claimants 
in the South China Sea and may give grounds for interpretation of some 
unclear issues under UNCLOS, such as the legal status of the islands 
(Storey 2013; BBC 2013).
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In the Statement and Notification Claim, the Philippines seek an 
award that “declares that China’s claims based on its nine dash line are 
inconsistent with the Convention and further invalid, determines wheth-
er certain of the maritime features claimed by both sides are islands, low 
tide elevation or submerged banks and whether are capable of generating 
entitlement to maritime zones greater than 12 nautical miles and enables 
the Philippines to exercise and enjoy the rights within and beyond its EEZ 
and continental shelf.”4
The Philippines and China are parties to the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.5 They both have not made any decla-
rations under article 287 UNCLOS as to choosing the adjudicating body 
from between the International Court of Justice, International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea, arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
Annex VII or a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VIII. In 
such case, s. 3 provides that a state party that is a party to a dispute not 
covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitra-
tion in accordance with Annex VII (Rao 2011; Boyle 1997).
Another issue that has to be explained before analyzing the substance 
of the Philippines submission is a declaration under article 298 UNCLOS. 
This article specifies optional exceptions to applicability of section 2 of 
Part XV UNCLOS, i.e. compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions.
China has made such a declaration in 2006 and does not accept com-
pulsory procedures over disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of article 15, article 74, and article 83 of UNCLOS relating to the sea 
boundary delimitations or those involving historic bays or titles (article 298 
(a)(i)), to disputes concerning military activities, law enforcement activities 
(article 298 (b)) and over disputes in respect of which the Security Council of 
the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned to it by the charter.
The Philippines Statement and Notification of Claim is carefully 
drafted, but in China’s view the Arbitral Tribunal will not find that in 
its jurisdiction (Beckman 2013a; Beckman 2013b). Moreover, they claim 
that that the Philippines’ note has serious errors in fact and law and false 
accusations. In their opinion the Philippines have broken their commit-
4 Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Notification and Statement 
of Claim of the Philippines dated January 22, 2013, viewed on May 2, 2014, <http://
www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/downloads/doc_download/523-notification-and-statement-
of-claim-on-west-philippine-sea >.
5 More on the status of the State Parties on DOALOS website: <http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm> viewed on April 5, 2013.
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ments, cast aside the framework of dialogue upheld by the majority of 
countries, refused to cooperate and cast a shadow over the relations and 
peace and stability of the South China Sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
People’s Republic of China 2013b).
China does not want to take part in the proceedings, has sent back 
the Notification and Statement of Claim to the Philippines and has not 
appointed its own arbitrator. It has a time-fixed limit to present its coun-
ter-memorial till December 15, 2014, but so far there has been no official 
indication as it finally might appear before the Tribunal. 
Annex VII and the Procedure Rules of the Tribunal state that there can 
be no adverse conclusions of the fact that the other party does not come to 
the court and present its position. The Arbitral Tribunal has to find that 
the Philippines’ claim is well founded in fact and law. Moreover, China 
has the possibility of joining the proceedings at any time if it decides so. 
The award, however, is binding even in case of a default of appearance.
China invokes that the Arbitral Tribunal will not have jurisdiction in 
this case, mainly because the claims presented by the Philippines regard 
territorial sovereignty. Such disputes are excluded on the virtue of article 
298 UNCLOS. Having that in mind and without knowing who has the 
ownership title over the features in the South China Sea, it might be ex-
tremely difficult to decide upon other matters, involving maritime zones. 
To add, article 288 UNCLOS sets out that only disputes concerning the 
application and interpretation of the Convention shall be within the scope 
of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Even if the Tribunal finds it has jurisdiction over the case, the claims 
must be found admissible. China would have to prove that the conditions 
set out in Part XV of UNCLOS have not been met by the Philippines. 
China finds the provision of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea binding, therefore excluding the possibility of satis-
fying the requirements of section 1 Part XV UNCLOS by the other party. 
This is based on the assumption that the declaration is an agreement 
and all settlements shall be done with a recourse to its provisions, not to 
third party adjudication. Moreover, in China’s view, there has not been an 
exchange of views on the matter of bringing the case to an international 
tribunal and there was no chance of proposing other solutions and pre-
senting views (Mincai 2014, p. 11).
Even though there are many controversies and objections from the 
Chinese side to the proceedings of the Tribunal, the international com-
munity is waiting for its decision as it might bring some clarification on 
the disputed matters, answer questions on the differences between islands 
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and rocks, and may cause that the countries of the region bring their laws 
into conformity with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (Mincai 2014).
Conclusions 
Undoubtedly, China secures its interest and has a  strong influence 
on the dispute in the South China Sea. It provides evidence of discovery 
and effective occupation of the features in the South China Sea, therefore 
claiming territorial sovereignty. It uses both the customary international 
law principles and the provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea to support it claims. For many, the ambiguous char-
acter of the nine-dashed line is an obstacle to settle the dispute without 
resorting to third party adjudication. The South China Sea dispute has 
a very complicated nature and an international tribunal would have to 
assess many issues, including the definition of an island or what effect 
can be given to it in an area where there are so many overlapping zones.
Concluding, the South China Sea dispute has been the main focus of 
politics in the region of South East Asia, it is important to the interna-
tional community and claimants should cooperate to settle it in a peace-
ful way. China’s claim to the South China Sea is based on many historic 
factors what makes the case interesting also from a legal perspective. The 
near future might bring new answers and set a new legal order in the wa-
ters of the South China Sea.
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